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ARTICLES
THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE:
A REEXAMINATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
By David A. Householder
I. INTRODUCTION
American copyright law operates at the juncture between the market-
place of ideas and the marketplace of property. The marketplace of ideas
was a revolutionary, political notion to the Framers of the Constitution,
reflecting their faith in the wisdom of the people at large to sift through a
multitude of ideas and accept those that were in their best interests. It was
a political notion because the writings most familiar to the Framers were
what today we would call nonfiction and largely relevant to political
thought. This faith is embodied in the First Amendment, which explicitly
protects the marketplace of ideas from interference by the government.'
The latter half of the eighteenth century was known as the Age of
Enlightenment, a neoclassical, Augustan age. Contemporary writings of the
creative or imaginative type were scarce. Those types of works that were
considered to be creative or imaginative, such as music, painting, and
architecture, were generally not thought of as copyrightable subject matter.
Motivating such creativity was not a priority. Instead, the willingness to
protect the writings of authors was motivated by a desire to promote the
progress of science or what would now be referred to as general knowl-
edge.
In order for a marketplace of ideas to operate optimally and efficient-
ly, economical and effective dissemination of information is necessary.
Copyright is a means by which the ideas traded in the marketplace can be
disseminated. Copyright confers property rights on the owner, an
appropriate vehicle to achieve such dissemination. American copyright law
is just as concerned with protecting and encouraging the dissemination of
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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copyrightable works as it is with the origination of such works.2 However,
it has nothing to do with the content or nature of the ideas disseminated.
Copyright law separates ideas from their expressions and regulates
only uses of the latter because only expressions have the tangibility
necessary for a property right. Ideas and their creation are beyond the
scope of copyright law. American copyright law is a trade law, not an art
or moral law. It is concerned only with controlling the uses that others
make of the original, tangible expressions by which an author's ideas are
conveyed.
Over the years however, courts have given credence to a number of
concepts that, through ritualistic incantation have attained the unfortunate
status of basic tenets of copyright law, even though they have little if any
relevance to the basic purposes of American copyright law. Each of these
erroneous concepts is cited in one of the Supreme Court's most recent and
most influential discussions of the fundamental principles of copyright law,
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.:
1. A copyright is a monopoly;4
2. Copyright is intended to motivate creativity;5
3. Copyright law makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration;
6
4. The public interest is served primarily by the limited
duration of copyright;7 and
5. The public interest competes with the interests of individ-
ual authors.8
None of these concepts would have been familiar to James Madison as a
Framer of the Constitution, nor do they reflect an especially accurate
understanding of the practical application of copyright law in society.
This article will undertake a systematic reevaluation of the basic
policy and principles of American copyright law by returning to the source
of such law, the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution: "The
Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science... by
2. See 1 MELvnLE B. NIMMER & DAvID NiMmfE, NIMMER ON COPYRIGTrr §§ 1.03[A], 1.04,
1.06[AJ (1993).
3. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
4. IdM at 429.
5. Id.
6. Id. (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
7. IM.
8. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429.
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securing for limited Tunes to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings .... 9
The remainder of the terms in the Copyright Clause will be analyzed
in more detail. Madison's commentary in The Federalist is the only
authoritative interpretation of the Copyright Clause by the Framers, and it
will be used to assist in the analysis of the Copyright Clause. ° The
structure of the Copyright Clause is one of successive modification, where
each term is modified by those succeeding it, roughly making the first term
the most qualified and most dependent on context, and the last term the
least qualified and least dependent on context. For this reason, the terms
will be considered from last to first in an attempt to understand the true
meaning of the policy and principles expressed in the Copyright Clause.
II. WRITNGS
The Copyright Act of 1790 protected only books, maps and nautical
charts as writings." 'With the advance of technology, however, other
types of tangible expression became publishable," and Congress and the
courts thought it appropriate to confer copyright protection on such expres-
sions. 3 By the late nineteenth century, a broad definition of the constitu-
tional term "writings" had become well accepted: "By writings in that
clause is meant the literary productions of those authors, and Congress very
properly has declared these to include all forms of writing, printing,
engraving, etching, [etc.], by which the ideas in the mind of the author are
given visible expression."' 4 In the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "1976
Act")," "writings" has been replaced with the phrase "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression....
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (It must be noted that thd word science follows eighteenth
century usage in denoting general knowledge, which may be advanced by both informational or
scientific works, and creative or imaginative works. One would be hard pressed to find a court
or commentator in disagreement with this premise. Modem usage of the word science refers to
the progress of knowledge, and this article will adopt such usage.).
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
11. Taylor v. Gilman, 24 F. 632, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
12. Id. at 633.
13. Il
14. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
15. All section references in the text are to the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1988).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
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A. Ideas and Expression
Writings are the tangible expressions of an author. The distinction
between an author's ideas and his expressions is a fundamental principle of
copyright law. Countering the proposition that books are made up of ideas
that are incapable of appropriation as property, an early advocate of
copyright noted that "books are not made up of ideas alone, but are, and
necessarily must be clothed in a language, and embodied in a form, which
give them an individuality and identity, that make them more distinguish-
able than any other personal property can be."'"
This distinction is commonly known as "the idea-expression dichoto-
my. '18 This principle forms the basis of section 102 of the Copyright Act
of 1976. Together, subsections (a) and (b) of the 1976 Act support this
principle. Subsection (a) states in pertinent part that "(c]opyright protection
subsists... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression.... ."9 Subsection (b) states in pertinent part that copyright
protection does not "extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied." 2 The idea-
expression dichotomy recognizes the difference between the concrete (the
actual description, explanation, illustration or embodiment) and the abstract
(the idea or procedure, etc.). Despite the difficulty faced in applying it,
courts have recognized this principle and have stated succinctly that
"[c]opyright law protects an author's expression; facts and ideas within a
work are not protected.
' 21
17. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 596 (1834) (argument of Mr. Paine for
appellants). Although the distinction between ideas and expression was recognized by counsel
in Wheaton the import of this distinction apparently was not very clear in the mind of Justice
M'Lean, who wrote in the opinion:
A book is valuable on account of the matter it contains, the ideas it communicates,
the instruction or entertainment it affords. Does the author hold a perpetual
property in these? Is there an implied contract by every purchaser of his book, that
he may realise [sic] whatever instruction or entertainment which the reading of it
shall give, but shall not write out or print its contents[?]
Id at 657. The contemplated answer to the second rhetorical question appears to be "no," but
modem courts would not hesitate to respond in the affirmative (although the duty not to copy
would be said to arise as a matter of statutory tort, not implied contract).
18. See 1 N1MtER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.03[D].
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
21. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Narell v. Freeman, 872
F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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The distinction between ideas and expression is not merely a matter
of convenient language; it achieves important policy goals. First, this
distinction serves to ensure that copyright law does not conflict with the
principles of the First Amendment.' Second, the distinction also
differentiates copyright law from the related patent law. As will be
discussed later, the line between ideas and expression allows copyright law
to avoid the type of antitrust abuses that are possible in patent law.' In
essence, because copyright law affords protection only to particular
expressions and not to ideas, a copyright is not a monopoly and should not
be referred to as such.24 The distinction between ideas and expression
also accounts for the differing application of the "limited times" require-
ment to copyright and patent.'
B. Abstraction, Compilation and Structural Expression
In literary works especially, the line between ideas and expressions is
not always easy to draw because expression in literary works includes not
merely literal expression (the order of the words on the page) but also
elements of structural expression.' Structural expression must be
abstracted from a work, but at a certain level of abstraction, one begins
describing unprotectable ideas, not protectable expression. This problem
was described most eloquently by Judge Learned Hand:
Upon any work ... a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident
is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the [work] is about, and at times
might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since other-
22. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985).
23. See infra part M.E.
24. See infra part MI.C.
25. See infra parts mI.D., V.
26. Nimmer refers to this concept as "comprehensive nonliteral" expression. 3 NnImER &
NrmMER, supra note 2, § 13.03[A][1J. The term "structural" expression goes further in describing
this type of expression; it is borrowed from the field of linguistic literary criticism, which itself
borrowed the term from Claude Levi-Strauss's seminal study of primitive cultures, Structural
Anthropology. Structuralism refers to any study of the relationship of tangible components of any
text, i.e., any object of analysis. All works of art have structural components as well as tangible
or literal components.
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wise the [author] could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which,
apart from their expression, his property is never extended.27
Judge Hand thought that the problem of defining the difference
between abstractions that are protectable expression and those that are
unprotectable ideas was insoluble: "Nobody has ever been able to fix that
boundary, and nobody ever can."' The principle by which this distinction
may be made, however, is expressed in the 1976 Act, although the
universality of its application has not always been recognized.29
When an author writes (writing out words in a particular order), he
not only composes, he also compiles (giving structure to the information
and ideas that he expresses). Compilation, which describes a process more
than a result, is defined in section 101 of the 1976 Act: "A 'compilation'
is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials
or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."3
This principle recognizes that an arrangement of expressions is itself an
expression. This is best illustrated by cases involving directories and other
factual or data compilations, where only structural expression, or compila-
tion, is protected.3
Imagine a copyrighted work as a stone wall, and the stones therein as
literal expressions. If an author forms the stones themselves, the stones
themselves are protectable. But even if he lawfully uses stones formed by
others or those in the public domain, his selection and arrangement of those
unoriginal stones is still protectable. Another mason may not utilize the
same selection and arrangement of the same unoriginal stones without the
previous mason's authorization. Appropriation of the structural expression
constitutes an infringement of the copyright. According to section 101 of
the 1976 Act, compilation consists of collection and assembly through a
process of selection, coordination or arrangement.32 Compilation is a form
of protectable expression, even though the literal expressions compiled may
not be protectable 3
The compilation principle applies to all copyrightable works, not just
to factual or data-based works, because it is impossible to draw a line of
27. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
28. Id
29. See supra note 15.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
31. Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., I11 S. CL 1282 (1991).
32. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
33. Id.
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distinction between those ideas that constitute pure information or data,
those that constitute scientific and philosophical concepts, and those that
constitute mere entertainment' 4
The courts, however, have been reluctant to recognize the absence of
a true distinction.3" In the case of factual works, this result may be due
to the notion that facts are not protectable, and the only protectable form
of expression is the manner in which those facts are compiled. In fictional,
literary, and dramatic works, literal expressions such as lines of dialogue,
characters, settings, and specific incidents, may be protectable if original.
But this does not negate the validity of the principle that the manner in
which they are selected, coordinated or arranged is also a protectable form
of expression, notwithstanding the protectability of the literal expressions.
C. Derivation
Frequently, an author derives his work from a previous work. This
derivation principle is expressed in the definitional section of the 1976 Act:
"A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted."3 The right of derivation is one of the exclusive
rights granted to the owner of a copyright.3 7 A derivative work is one that
uses both original and unoriginal, or preexisting, forms of expression.
An author may take ideas as well as expressions from preexisting
works. For example, Shakespeare took from Holinshed many of the ideas
for his history plays, as well as the substance of a few of the characters'
speeches.3" If Shakespeare had been operating under the current copyright
34. Consider today's most technologically advanced medium for the mass transfer of
information: television. The most watched television shows, and those whose viewer numbers
are rapidly increasing, are those that blur the line between traditional news and traditional
entertainment, such as docu-dramas, historical reenactmnents, and movies based on true stories.
Even presidential campaigns conducted through talk-show formats are commonly viewed as
entertainment. Any attempt by the law that draws a distinction between creative ideas and
information is entirely futile.
35. See generally, Nichols, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); Feist, 111 S. CL 1282 (1991).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988).
38.
Johnson's flat assertion that the play was "extracted" from Holinshed's Chronicles
"with very little alteration" has not deterred research .... Although Shakespeare's
1993]
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law, he would have negotiated a contract with Holinshed's estate to
purchase the right to make derivative works from his Chronicles. Yet the
careful construction of Shakespeare's plots, the richness and sheer beauty
of his language, and the fullness of his characters, combined to produce
truly inspired works of dramatic art of which Holinshed was entirely
incapable. If the copyright law would have hindered Shakespeare in
obtaining and maintaining the right to use Holinshed's work, thereby
inhibiting him from writing the histories, then the policy objective of
promoting the progress of knowledge would not have been satisfied.
Assuming that the policy of copyright law is to promote the progress
of knowledge, one must consider whether that policy is furthered by giving
the original author the right to restrict the derivative author's ability to
disseminate his derivative work thereby restricting dissemination of the
original expressions contained in the derivative work. American copyright
law has always given an author the right to recapture his exclusive rights
after expiration of a certain period of time because the author originally
may have been in a weak bargaining position with his publisher."
Allowing the author to recapture gives him a bargaining position more
commensurate with the relative value of the work which often remains
unknown until after extensive dissemination has taken place. The question
remains whether an author whose work is lawfully' used as the basis of
a derivative work can retain exclusive rights in the latter work that may be
recaptured at the prescribed time. Moreover, should the derivative author
be in the same position as the publisher of the preexisiting work, and
similarly be subject to the possibility of recapture by the first author?
The Supreme Court has decided that when the author of a preexisting
work exercises his right of recapture, he recaptures rights to control the
dissemination of the derivative work.4 In Stewart v. Abend, the plaintiff
was the successor to the copyright in Cornell Woolrich's story "It Had To
debt to the second (1587) edition of Holinshed is clear, not only for the record of
the main events of Richard's later reign but sometimes (as in Ul.iv.) for the very
language of a scene, several other alleged sources have been put forward.
Hershel Baker, Introduction to Richard H, in THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 800 (1974).
"Sometimes, however, as when Canterbury 'justly and religiously' expounds the Salic law
(I.ii.33-95) and when Henry upbraids the conspirators (I.ii.166-81), Shakespeare simply versifies
Holinshed's Third Volume of Chronicles (1587), errors and all.... Hershel Baker Introduction
to Henry V, id. at 930.
39. See generally, Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-64 (1909). See also Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217-18 (1990).
40. The right to prepare a derivative work is conveyed by the owner of the rights in the
preexisting work.
41. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
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Be Murder."42 In exercising his right of recapture, the plaintiff success-
fully halted public exhibition of Alfred Hitchcock's classic motion picture,
Rear Window, which was derived from Woolrich's story.43 If this result
were to have lasting precedential value, Hollywood would be forced to
curtail purchasing the rights to stories and novels for derivative motion
pictures because the authors of the preexisting works might obtain the right
to control dissemination of the motion pictures derived therefrom. The
possibility of such control by the author would deprive the producer of his
full return on the considerable investment required to produce a motion
picture. Clearly, neither authors, studios or the public are served by such
a policy.
The language of the statute expresses the correct policy; the Stewart
holding does not. The Stewart Court noted that section 304(c)(6)(A) of the
1976 Act explicitly denied authors of works originated under the Copyright
Act of 1909 (the "1909 Act") any exclusive rights in others' works lawfully
derived from such 1909 Act works." The Court further remarked that this
section provided an exception to what would otherwise be "a third
opportunity for the author to benefit from a work" created under the 1909
Act.45 Furthermore, the Court was of the opinion that the 1976 Act's offer
of a third bite of the apple had no bearing on the scope of the 1909 Act's
second renewal bite, which the Court said did not exclude already prepared
derivative works.4
For works created under the 1976 Act, however, the only subsequent
bite is exactly that described as the "third" bite in the Stewart opinion and
set forth in section 304(c)(6)(A).47 The right of recapture is defined in
section 203(b)(1) in exactly the same language as the third bite cavalierly
disregarded by the Court in Stewart.Q By the Court's own admission and
by the plain language of the statute, this provision prevents an author from
recapturing rights in works already lawfully derived from his work.49 As
works originating under the 1909 Act slide into the public domain and are
replaced by works originating under the 1976 Act, only section 203(b)(1)
42. Id.
43. See generally, id at 238.
44. Id. at 226 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A) (1988)).
45. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 225 (The first being the original sale, and the second being the right
of recapture exercisable at the time of renewal).
46. See id
47. Id
48. Id. at 226 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (1988)).
49. Id.
1993]
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will be applied to recapture rights, rendering the conclusions of the Stewart
Court inapplicable.
Im. ExcLusrvE RIGHTS
A. A Copyright as a Property Right
Under the Copyright Clause, Congress may grant the exclusive rights
to authors' expressions."0 It is now politically correct to call a copyright
a monopoly,"' but there is no good reason to do so. Copyrights are
simply property rights because they have the main characteristics of
property, value and enforceability.5 2 Calling a copyright a monopoly has
never added anything to an analysis of a dispute arising under copyright
law. It is perhaps the most prominent example of language that does not
fit its underlying concepts in the copyright field.
A copyright has value because of its transferability and because there
is a market for it.53 A market kept free from unwarranted interference is
the best way to assure that writings most valuable to society become the
most widely disseminated. Because we live in a democratic society free
from most government regulation of writings, there can be no value
judgment made on copyrightable works by Congress or the courts. As long
as a work meets the two minimal requirements, tangibility and originality,
it is entitled to enter the market.' The market alone determines its value.
An unfettered market represents the most direct form of democracy. A
copyright owner's efforts are rewarded in proportion to the number of
people who find the work valuable.
In fact, because of the First Amendment and the unique characteristics
of reproducible intellectual property, the market created by copyright law
is one of the most democratic of all markets. The value of the intellectual
material cannot adequately be estimated a priori, but may be determined in
large measure by the sheer number of sales. All competing motion pictures
and books are similarly priced for the buying public because the actual
50. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8. cl. 8.
51. Even Nimmer calls a copyright a monopoly, but he uses the term in its most reduced
meaning, referring to nothing more than the right of a property owner over his property. See
I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.03[A].
52. Copyright law is intended "to grant valuable, [and] enforceable rights to authors,
publishers . Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939) (emphasis added).
53. Id
54. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.0311B].
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material cost is equal for all works of a similar type. Furthermore, they can
be sold more or less indefinitely without damaging the intellectual content
of the work. The reward to the copyright owner increases not as a result
of his ability to raise the price of his work, but primarily as a result of his
ability to sell the same thing at the same price more often. Using a
democratic metaphor, he gets more "votes" for his work.
A paradox of the market concept is that, while a market must be free
from unwarranted regulation to work most effectively, it cannot work at all
without the protection of the government. An exclusive right requires a
power capable of enforcing the owner's right to exclude. Congress has the
power to decide which uses of a copyrightable work are to be exclusive to
the owner.5 The sole function of the courts is to provide a remedy for
wrongs committed in the copyright marketplace, and by doing so to assure
the smooth functioning of the market. Without such protection, dis-
seminators would be unwilling to purchase copyrightable works because
their exclusivity could not be assured, and the market would break down.
The Framers empowered Congress to grant exclusive rights so that a market
for writings could exist, a market free from executive interference but
subject to judicial control over abuses of the market within the parameters
of rights prescribed by the legislature.
56
B. A Copyright is a Natural Property Right
Copyright, like other forms of property, was considered a natural
right.' There is no evidence that the Framers considered it to be a
monopoly or purely a statutory creature. James Madison clearly thought
it was a natural right: "The copyright of authors has been solemnly
adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law." 8 Nevertheless,
copyright was considered to be subject to extraordinary regulation because
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
57. See I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.03[A].
58. THE FEDERAIJST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
Recent scholarship has suggested that the traditional view of the holding referred to here by
Madison is incorrect, and that the House of Lords in fact decided that there was no common law
copyright. Donaldson v. Beckett, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774). This, of course, raises an
interesting question: if Madison was under a mistaken impression as to the state of British
common law and wrote that impression into the Constitution, should the Constitution be
interpreted as meaning what Madison thought the law to be, or what the law actually was despite
Madison's mistaken impression?
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of its extraordinary nature. 9 Unlike other forms of property, not all uses
should be exclusive to owners. But, a copyright should be allowed to
function in a market like any other form of property.
The first significant case under American copyright law was Wheaton
v. Peters.6° The sole question for review was whether a natural, common
law right could be enforced in the face of the statutory provisions for
copyright.6' It is apparent that neither side advanced any notion that
copyright was a monopoly, and therefore susceptible to the evils of a
monopoly. Arguing in favor of such enforcement, Daniel Webster seemed
to have the best grasp of the nature of copyright:
The import of the [A]ct of [C]ongress of 1790 is, that before its
enactment, there were legal rights of authorship existing; it
provides for existing property, not for property created by the
statute. There is nothing for its provisions to stand upon, but
the common law. That law is not one of grant or bounty; it
recognizes existing rights, which it secures. The aim of the
statute was to benefit authors, and thereby the public.
The right of an author to the production of his mind is
acknowledged every where [sic]. It is a prevailing feeling, and
none can doubt that a man's book is his book - is his property.
It may be true that it is property which requires extraordinary
legislative protection, and also limitation. Be it so.62
All participants in the Wheaton case must have been well aware of the
case of Donaldson v. Beckett, which had been decided in the House of
Lords only thirteen years before the Constitutional Convention.63
Moreover, everybody assumed that the Framers were familiar with
Donaldson, so they looked to that case to determine the intent of the
Framers in giving Congress the power to enact copyright legislation."
According to the Wheaton Court, Donaldson determined that the effect of
the British copyright statute was to take away this natural right and to
replace it with a right as delineated in the statute, although copyright was
a natural right originally enforceable at common law.6 The Wheaton
Court, therefore, followed Donaldson as closely as possible. "That every
59. See generally Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 653.
63. Donaldson v. Beckett, I Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774). The Constitutional Convention
convened in June, 1787.
64. Wheaton 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 602.
65. Id. at 656.
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man is entitled to the fruits of his own labour must be admitted; but he can
enjoy them only except by statutory provision under the rules of property,
which regulate society, and which define the rights of things in general.""
Wheaton accepted the proposition that copyright was a property right, but
only enforceable pursuant to statutory regulation from Congress because of
its extraordinary nature.
C. A Copyright is Not a Monopoly
It was less than a decade after Wheaton that the notion of copyright
as a monopoly began to gain acceptance. The British historian Thomas
Macaulay advanced this notion in an address to Parliament in 1841:
Copyright is monopoly, and produces all the effects which the
general voice of mankind attributes to monopoly. The effect of
monopoly generally is to make articles scarce, to make them
dear, and to make them bad. It is good that authors should be
remunerated; and the least exceptionable way of remunerating
them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is an evil. For the sake
of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not
to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing
the good.'
Lord Macaulay's conclusions are undoubtedly correct, but his premise is
not. Copyright, properly defined and limited, is not a monopoly.
Monopoly is defined as "[a] privilege or peculiar advantage vested in
one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right (or
power) to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular
article, or control the sale of the whole supply of a particular commodi-
ty."'  A monopoly is usually considered to be a power to exclude
competitors from the marketplace, thereby destroying the effectiveness of
the market to regulate prices.69 An open market is the best mechanism for
regulating prices by adjusting the price of each transaction to more closely
approximate the actual value (cost plus value) being conveyed. The vice
66. Id. at 658.
67. Address by Thomas Babington Macaulay to Parliament (1841), in BARBARA A. RINGER,
THE DEMONOLOGY OF COPYRIGHT 13 (1974).
68. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1007 (6th ed. 1990).
69. See also 1 RUDOLPH CALLMAN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEmARKS &
MONoPOLiES § 4.21 (Louis Altman ed., 1981 rev.) ("Monopolization presupposes the possession
of market control... by means of which it is possible to exclude actual or potential competitors
from any part of the [market].").
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of monopoly "is the denial to commerce of the supposed protection of
competition."O7
A monopolist has the exclusive right to exclude competitors from the
market; the exclusive right of a copyright owner, like that of other property
owners, is merely the right to exclude others from using the property."'
If, as the Wheaton Court stated, "[a] book is valuable on account of the
matter it contains, the ideas it communicates, the instruction or entertain-
ment it affords,"'72 then it is clear that a copyright owner has no monopo-
ly.
Because copyright protection extends only to particular expressions,
not ideas, a copyright owner has no power to exclude other expressions of
the same ideas and information that are encompassed in his work. If
another expresses even substantially similar ideas in a different but more
direct, more understandable, or more entertaining manner, usurping some
portion of a previous copyright owner's market, the first owner is powerless
to prevent this competition. Although the first owner may hold the
exclusive right to produce copies of his particular expression, he controls
only the market for that particular expression, which still must compete
with other expressions of the same or similar ideas. It is like saying the
owner of the lot on the northwest comer of Elm and First Streets controls,
and is able to exclude competitors from the market for, property on the
northwest comer of Elm and First Streets. That owner's right is a property
right; calling it a monopoly adds nothing to an understanding of the
owner's rights. Such usage merely serves to make the meaning of the term
"monopoly" less precise and therefore less useful.
A copyright is not a true monopoly for the same reasons that it does
not interfere with First Amendment rights: copyright protects only
expressions and not ideas.73 Because no one is given exclusive rights in
the marketplace of ideas, there is no power to exclude competitors from the
public market for any particular copyrightable work.
70. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
71. A copyright is even more narrow than other property rights, because the uses that may
be excluded are more narrowly and precisely defined. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1988).
72. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 657.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1988).
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D. The Difference Between Copyright and Patent
There is an important distinction between copyright and patent. A
patent can confer monopoly power and is designed to do so.74 The more
valuable patents are those that give the owner exclusive right to produce a
particular product, bestowing the right to exclude competing producers of
the same product. Unlike copyright protection, patent protection extends
to ideas. The Patent Clause of the Constitution, intertwined with the
Copyright Clause, empowers Congress to extend exclusive rights to
discoveries. However, "[i]n no case does copyright protection ...
extend to any... discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in [a copyrightable] work."7' Patent
protection also bars like but subsequent and independent discoveries from
being marketed, whereas copyright does not empower the owner to exclude
such works from the market. 77
This distinction is often overlooked because of the intertwined nature
of the Patent and Copyright Clause. For example, in Wheaton, counsel for
the appellant argued for the enforceability of a common law copyright, and
pointed to the Constitutional use of the term "secure" to bolster the claim
that the Framers intended merely to empower Congress to recognize an
existing property right, not to abrogate and replace it." However, the
Court disagreed that the verb "secure!' was intended to apply to a natural
common law right, since the same word also applied to patent, which
nobody had ever contended constituted a natural right. 9
74. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
75. Id.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
77. This is because novelty is required for a patent, whereas a copyright requires only
originality. See infra part IV.B.
78. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 602-03 (1834). "Had the convention designed
to take away, or to authorize congress to take away the common law property, they would have
used the words vest, or grant, and would have carefully avoided the word secure." Id. (argument
of Mr. Peine for appellants).
79.
There is no mode by which the meaning affixed to any word or sentence, by a de-
liberative body, can be so well ascertained, as by comparing it with the words and
sentences with which it stands connected. By this rule the word secure, as used in
the constitution, could not mean the protection of an acknowledged legal right. It
refers to inventors, as well as authors, and it has never been pretended, by any one,
either in this country or in England, that an inventor has a perpetual right, at
common law, to sell the thing invented.
Id. at 661.
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The Wheaton Court erred, however, when it ruled that "secure" could
not be used in reference to a natural right because it was also applied to
patents and nobody ever thought a patent was a natural right. Apparently,
Madison thought so. After pointing out that copyright is a common law
right, he wrote that "[tihe right to useful inventions seems with equal
reason to belong to the inventors."80 Whether or not Madison was correct
in this assumption, it does indicate that the Wheaton Court may have been
wrong, and that the verb "secure" in the Copyright Clause was in fact
intended to apply to a natural property right.
E. Copyright Alone Cannot Lead to Antitrust Abuses
With the advance in understanding and application of antitrust
principles in the early twentieth century, there has been a failure to
recognize the important distinction between copyright and patent, common-
ly referring to both concepts as monopolies. The most important case
analyzing the antitrust implications of copyright was United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc.,81 an antitrust case against the studio distribution
system in Hollywood during the 1940s. It is hard to find a more misguided
interpretation of the impact of copyright law.
Among the studio's distribution practices under attack in Paramount
was "block-booking," the practice of offering one or a group of films to
exhibitors on the condition that the exhibitor also purchase a license to
other specified films during the same period.' Assuming that a copyright
was like a patent and therefore a monopoly, the Court saw this practice as
a classic case of "tying," or in other words, extorting a price higher than
the value of the tied product as a result of the power invested in the seller
from the lawful monopoly of the base product.s If we assume that
antitrust tying can actually occur if the base product is covered by a legal
monopoly, such an abuse can obviously be achieved by a patent. A buyer
can be forced to pay an inflated price for otherwise easily obtainable
accessories if he can purchase a commodity only by also purchasing the
accessories from the same seller.
The Paramount Court assumed, without inquiry, that the same kind
of antitrust abuse could be accomplished by a copyright owner, and found
80. THE FDERAtLSr No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
81. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
82. Id. at 156.
83. Id. at 157.
AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
that block-booking constituted such a practice.8 However, the opinion
overlooked two basic principles that render this conclusion erroneous.
First, the Court ignored the principle that courts cannot adjudge the
value of the intellectual material contained in a copyrightable work; only
the public marketplace can make a judgment. Courts are not empowered
to make such value judgments; once a work is recognized as meeting the
minimal requirements of copyright, originality and tangibility, the
intellectual value 5 of a work is beyond the court's sphere of influence.
The Court observed that "the reward [to the copyright owner] does not
serve its public purpose if it is not related to the quality of the copy-
right."86 A court, however, cannot legitimately make a value judgment on
the intellectual quality of the work, which would be required if it were to
examine the relationship between that value and the price.
Justice Holmes first noted that "[iut would be a dangerous undertaking
for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of
the worth of [copyrightable works]."'" Courts are therefore limited to
determining whether the works have value at all, rather than the amount of
the intellectual value of the works. That limited inquiry is only one of
determining whether the work has achieved a market: "if they command
the interest of any public, they have a commercial value.""8
The Paramount Court described the problem as follows: "Where a
high quality film greatly desired is licensed only if an inferior one is taken,
the latter borrows quality from the former and strengthens its monopoly by
drawing on the other." 9 But from a legal standpoint, there is no way of
determining which of the two block-booked films is of a greater quality.
The legal irrelevance of this issue is highlighted by the Court's
conclusion: "The practice tends to equalize rather than differentiate the
reward for the individual copyright."' Even so, what then? No injury to
the buyer results from this purported inequity; the buyer pays what he
84. Id. at 156-57.
85. By intellectual value, I mean the value that only the public purchaser seeks to obtain from
the work, the value of the ideas and information conveyed by the work. A distributor or
publisher, by contrast, pays a price for the work (usually tied, by a royalty provision, to the
ultimate value to the public) not to reap the value of the ideas or information, but rather to add
the value of its distribution efforts to this cost and pass it on to the public purchaser.
86. Paramount, 334 U.S. at 158.
87. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
88. 1d at 252. The term "commercial value" is here used in the same sense that we use the
term "intellectual value," i.e., that portion of the purchase price that a public purchaser is willing
to add to the total cost of the value added by the dissemination system.
89. Paramount, 334 U.S. at 158.
90. Id.
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believes the package is worth, or he does not buy it at all based on the
value of the package to him. Moreover, block-booking assumes a single
seller who cannot possibly be injured because he purportedly collects
voluntarily undifferentiated rewards for his works. Even if the products of
more than one seller are packaged together, there is no inequity because
sellers will necessarily have agreed between themselves what constitutes an
equitable distribution of the proceeds. If some inequality between such
sellers results in a distribution of proceeds that is not equitable, then the
contract between the sellers may be at fault, not the contract between the
seller and the buyer.
The error of the Court's reasoning should have become apparent when
it arrived at the following conclusion: "Even where all the films included
in the package are of equal quality, the requirement that all be taken if one
is desired increases the market for some."9' Had the Court been paying
attention to basic copyright principles instead of blithely assuming that
copyright is a monopoly and therefore likely to lead to undesirable results,
it would have noticed that the result it complained of here is precisely the
result intended by copyright law; the market for a copyrightable work is
increased. How this result could be unlawful is not clear. The reward that
copyright bestows goes not only to authors but also to disseminators
(publishers, distributors, and the like). The legitimate occupation of the
disseminators is to increase the market for copyrightable works. A
purported "abuse" of copyright cannot have occurred if such use achieves
precisely the result desired by the policy of copyright law.
Second, the Paramount Court also overlooked the basic truth of the
principle that no seller of an entertainment product can, by exercise of a
purported monopoly, extort from the public more than the public is willing
to pay for the value obtained.' From a market standpoint, this is the
main difference between bread and circuses: when a man cannot afford
bread he dies, but when a man cannot afford the circus, he merely stops
going to the circus.
Essentially, what the Paramount defendants were doing was squeezing
out the middlemen, in this case independent exhibitors, rather than extorting
the public. The Court could have reached the same result merely by
enforcing the policy decision that such competitors were to be protected.
91. d
92. This may be true only to a point: it clearly applies as long as there are any other forms
of entertainment available. If no other forms of entertainment whatsoever are available, it is
conceivable that the public will pay more than the value obtained for the only product on the
market (although it is more likely that the public will invent an alternative form of entertainment).
AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
If there was any antitrust violation it was not a result of any individual
distributor requiring block-booking, but rather it was caused by the fact that
block-booking was a practice among all but one of the defendants." The
oligopolistic structure of the distribution industry created any antitrust abuse
that may have occurred. The same industry structure can, and has, resulted
in antitrust violations in the market for a number of other products that
have never been considered to be monopolies. 94 Mere copyrights in the
films, not being monopolies, could not have created the antitrust violation
that was the subject of the prosecution.
F A Copyright Improperly Extended Can Result in a Monopoly
One case that goes a long way, but unfortunately not quite far enough,
in recognizing the important difference between a patent and a copyright
regarding monopoly privileges is Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kal-
pakian.9' The court began by noting that patent registration is subject to
rigid governmental scrutiny to determine that the prerequisites of novelty,
usefulness and nonobviousness have been met before conferring exclusive
rights over the "conception that is the subject matter of the patent."96
Furthermore, the court noted that a copyright, which requires only
originality, is easily obtainable but "confers no right at all to the conception
reflected in the registered subject matter."'  For this reason, the court
correctly concluded that "a copyright must not be treated as equivalent to
a patent lest long continuing private monopolies be conferred over areas of
gainful activity without first satisfying the substantive and procedural
prerequisites to the grant of such privileges."9'
Building on the premise that copyright conferred no right over the
ideas expressed, the court noted that its task was to determine whether
protected expression or merely unprotected ideas were appropriated by the
defendant. 9 In performing this task, the court made a striking observa-
tion, stating that "[tihe guiding consideration in drawing the line [between
93. Paramount, 334 U.S. at 156.
94. See, eg., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (prosecution of
top three cigarette makers for monopolization of cigarette market).
95. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
96. ld. at 740.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 741.
99. Id.
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idea and expression] is the preservation of the balance between competition
and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws."'"'
The court saw its objective as limiting the copyright monopoly.'
Extending the so-called monopoly from expression to ideas would clearly
violate the basic principles of the Copyright Clause. The court understood
the concepts it faced. However, it merely used imprecise language to
describe them. Extending copyright protection from expression to ideas
does not merely extend the copyright monopoly, rather, it creates a
monopoly out of what otherwise would be only a property right as we have
seen. A copyright properly delineated is not a monopoly. But a copyright
improperly extended in its scope to cover the underlying ideas can result
in a monopoly.
IV. AUTHORS
A. The Motivation of Creativity
The Copyright Clause empowers Congress to grant exclusive rights
to authors." However, it may be somewhat inaccurate to assume that
the intent of the law is "to motivate the creative activity of authors... by
the provision of a special reward."' 3 If the creativity of artists was
motivated by nothing more than the prospect of riches, we should have a
poor culture indeed. For example, it seems unlikely that Bob Dylan writes
songs, or David Mamet plays, or Tom Robbins novels, because they are
motivated by the provision of a special reward. To the contrary, creativity
is self-motivated, and indeed, spontaneous.
Perhaps the most well-known and widely accepted analysis of this
creative motivation comes from the romantic poet William Wordsworth's
description of the creation of poetry as:
the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings; it takes its origin
from emotion recollected in tranquillity: the emotion is contem-
plated till [sic], by a species of re-action, the tranquillity
gradually disappears, and an emotion, kindred to that which was
before the subject of contemplation, is gradually produced, and
100. Kalpaldan. 446 F.2d at 742.
101. Id. "What is basically at stake is the extent of the copyright owner's monopoly-from
how large an area of activity did Congress intend to allow the copyright owner to exclude
others?" Id
102. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
103. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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does itself actually exist in the mind. In this mood successful
composition generally begins, and in a mood similar to this it is
carried on.'
In the cultural complex of personality and society that produces
creative works, the law has no place different from that of any other field
of endeavor: it can be an object of contemplation and a source of emotion.
For example, dramatists often use legal themes primarily because the legal
trial is one of the most naturally dramatic situations that occurs in human
affairs, with its intense conflict, natural exposition through argument, twists
and turns of fortune during the presentation of evidence, and convenient
resolution in a verdict.105
However, to state that the specific law of copyright motivates a person
to produce creative works is probably not accurate. The full creative
process is impenetrable to the rational tools of the law, and one can never
be certain that in any given case the promise of a reward is, or is not, a
factor in the creation of a copyrightable work. Perhaps the most that can
be said is the generalization that the societal effect of copyright law "is to
encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation
by granting authors the exclusive right to the fruits of their labor."'" For
example, if a person does create works, the law will facilitate a market, and
he may make a living creating such works.
The "fruits of their labor" metaphor, derived from the natural law of
property rights, is common to copyright law. Perhaps the Supreme Court's
most accurate rendition of the metaphor is that found in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises:0 7
copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest
of knowledge.... [Tihe scheme [is] established by the
Copyright Act for fostering the original works that provide the
seed and substance of this harvest. The rights conferred by
104. WRLAM WORDSWORTH, PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDIrION OF THE LYRICAL BALLADS
(1800), reprinted in ENGLISH ROMANTIC WRrTERS 328 (David Perkins ed., 1967).
105. The trial as a dramatic theme is nearly as old as drama itself. In the oldest extant trilogy
of Greek tragedy, Aeschylus' Oresteia, for example, the third play, The Eumenides is based on
the trial of Orestes, Agamemnon's son who killed his mother, Clytemnestra, to avenge his father's
murder. The prosecutors are a chorus of furies spurred on by Clytemnestra's ghost, Orestes'
advocate is Apollo, the presiding judge is Athena, and the jury is a panel of Athenian citizens
representing the forerunners of the historical Council of Areopagus. (For those interested in the
result, Orestes was acquitted).
106. Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 581 (D.D.C. 1981).
107. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of
knowledge a fair return for their labors."0 8
Copyright law facilitates creativity, but it does not motivate it. The best
that copyright law can do is not to impede creativity. Rather than inducing
persons to become authors, the concern of copyright law is primarily to
define those rights that accrue to persons who have become authors.
B. Only Originality is Required of an Author, Not Creativity
What is an "author?" "An author... is 'he to whom anything owes
its origin; originator, maker, one who completes a work of science or
literature.""' One becomes an author by originating expressions. As
courts have noted for more than a century, the only requirement for
becoming an author is that at least some portion of the expression be
original."0 Although an entire work is copyrightable, copyright protec-
tion extends only to those expressions that are original to the author. As
we have seen, protection does not extend either to ideas or to unoriginal
expressions used by an author in her work."'
One comes within the sphere of influence of the Copyright Clause by
producing works that exhibit originality, which is an extremely low
threshold requirement for copyright. "Originality in this context means
little more than a prohibition of actual copying. No matter how poor
artistically the author's addition, it is enough if it be his own.""'
Apparently, however, courts have tired of this minimalistic requirement, and
within the last decade or so have seen fit to add another requirement,
creativity, to that of originality, which for more than a century had been
recognized as the sole requirement for copyright protection in tangible
expressions.
What is the difference between originality and creativity? This
question has befuddled counsel and threatens unnecessarily to continue to
do so."' The most obvious difference between originality and creativity
108. Id at 545-46.
109. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
110. Id.
111. See supra part H.A.
112. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (quoting
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903)).
113. See, e.g., John Muller & Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer Team, Inc., 802 F.2d 989, 990
(8th Cir. 1986) ("Mhe issue here is creativity, not originality, although appellant's argument tends
to confuse the two."). The Muller court does not explain the difference.
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is that only the former is objectifiable and determinable as a matter of
evidence. The latter is merely a judicially imposed and purely subjective
requirement that renders the existence of an author's rights dependent on
whatever whimsical conception of this admittedly undefinable concept
happens to be held by a political appointee "trained only in the law."".4
Whether a work is "original" is a question of fact. Did the purported
author independently create the particular expression in his work for which
he seeks copyright protection, or is the expression in question found in
preexisting works from which he probably copied it? If required to do so,
most courts would call the question of creativity a mixed question of law
and fact, but in truth, it is neither. It is purely a subjective question, the
answer to which necessarily will vary from individual to individual. A
perverse sort of progress is achieved when cumulative jurisprudence
succeeds in adding such a quantum of uncertainty to the law. Only the
objectively determinable qualification of originality is, or at least should be,
required.
C. Application of the Erroneous Creativity Requirement
A requirement of creativity is wholly inconsistent with Justice
Holmes' condemnation of judicial attempts to determine the intellectual
value of works."' If a market exists for the work, then it is not for the
courts to deny that market by announcing that the work has no value
capable of being traded. If works can "command the interest of any public,
they have a commercial value - it would be bold to say that they have not
an aesthetic and educational value - and the taste of any public is not to
be treated with contempt.""' 6 But courts today routinely display such
boldness in finding that marketable works lack the requisite amount of
creativity and therefore are not marketable because no property rights
subsist in them.
114. This is not an indictment of thecourts alone, since apparently the Register of Copyrights
has also gotten into the act of deciding whether original works are creative. See, e.g. Muller 802
F.2d at 990 (upholding determination by trial court that "the Register had not abused his
discretion in finding that appellant's logo lacked the level of creativity needed for copyrightabil-
ity").
115. Bleistein v. Donaldson ithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
116. Id. at 252.
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1. John Muller & Co. v. New York Arrows 3occer Team, Inc.
An example of a court and the Register of Copyrights standing like
hulking guards over the entrance to the marketplace is found in John
Muller & Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer Team, Inc." 7 The plaintiff was
hired by the defendant soccer team to perform certain advertising services,
including designing a logo for the team."' The plaintiff created one that
"consist[ed] of four angled lines which form an arrow and the word
'Arrows' in cursive script below the arrow.""' 9 Although a fee dispute
erupted, the team apparently used the logo designed by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff attempted to register his copyright for the logo, but the Register of
Copyright denied his application "saying that [the logo] lacked the minimal
creativity necessary to support a copyright.""'
This conclusion has its roots in an outdated decision of the Supreme
Court in The Trade-Mark Cases, where the Court held that the trademarks
at issue were not copyrightable, but did so in such a manner as to propound
the erroneous rule that trademarks in general are not copyrightable.
12 1
The Court noted that rights in a trademark grow out of the use of the mark,
which, because it does not necessarily require any intellectual labor to
create, is not a product of intellectual labor and therefore not copyright-
able." Beyond the fractured logic supporting it, this holding, if applied
today, would overlook the fact that corporations often spend large sums on
developing fanciful, arbitrary, or at least suggestive trademarks because of
their greater protection as compared to merely descriptive marks. Clearly
fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive works are creative, and there is no reason
why they cannot be copyrightable if original, even though trademark rights
arise only through use, not creation. Trademark rights and copyrights are
like apples and oranges, but there is no reason that the same basket cannot
carry both.
If the New York Arrows logo required no creativity to produce, then
the team could have had a clerk in its mailroom do it and would not have
hired a company of professionals such as the plaintiff. Even if the team
had appointed a clerk to the task of developing an original logo, he would
117. 802 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1986).
118. id. at 990.
119. Id.
120. Id (emphasis added).
121. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
122. Id at 94.
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have produced a logo that "expresses its singularity"' 3 and would have
been at least "a very modest grade of art [that] has in it something
irreducible, which is one man's alone."' 4 According to Justice Holmes,
"[t]hat something he may copyright, unless there is a restriction in the
words of the act."" 5 However, based on the Register of Copyrights and
the Muller courts, Holmes' conclusion was inapplicable in this case simply
because the plaintiff had not met the personal standards of creativity
concocted by the particular political appointees that confronted it.
The requirement of creativity is not "a restriction in the words of the
act."' 126 The 1976 Act requires only that a work be original, and "fixed
in any tangible medium of expression."127 The restriction barring
copyright for works purportedly lacking in creativity has been imposed, not
by Congress, the only governmental body constitutionally empowered to
impose such a restriction, but by unnecessarily bold executive and judicial
functionaries."n The requirement of creativity is erroneous because it
does not fit the underlying concepts of copyright itself, regardless of
whether the implementation of the restriction also violates some other
Constitutional requirement. Creativity would be an undesirable requirement
even were Congress to impose it, and the Register of Copyright and the
courts would be well advised not to rush in where Congress has had the
wisdom not to tread.
2. Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Service, Inc.
The creativity requirement gained recent momentum from a series of
cases involving compilations of factual material, which are often contrasted
to creative works. 9 As noted above, compilations are collections of
123. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250.
124. Id
125. Md In this example, the clerk's logo would be a "work made for hire," and the team
could copyright it. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
126. The only restrictions found in the Copyright Act on the copyrightability of original,
tangible works are those on such works produced by certain foreign authors, and by the federal
government. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105 (1988).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
128. This imposition can be seen as a violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine.
129. For example, one of the factors in deciding whether a defendant has made fair use of
a copyrighted work is the nature of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988). Courts
conducting a fair use analysis often allow defendants greater latitude if the work supposedly
copied is informational or factual as opposed to creative. See, e.g. Diamond v. Am-Law Pub.
Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984) ("The work in question was avowedly informational, and
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preexisting materials, for which copyright protection subsists only in the
selection, coordination or arrangement of such materials. 30 If any of that
selection, coordination or arrangement is original, the work is copyrightable.
One of the most egregious examples of the improper use of a
creativity requirement is found in the case of Financial Information, Inc.
v. Moody's Investors Service, Inc.'31 There, the plaintiff produced a card
service for investors that listed information regarding bond redemptions; the
defendant, also in the financial information business, copied information
from the plaintiff's cards.'3 2 The trial court found the plaintiff's cards
were copyrightable and the defendant's use of them fair use.'33
The Court of Appeals reversed on the fair use issue, but remanded for
further findings on the copyrightability issue. " In attempting to deni-
grate the plaintiff's work for the benefit of the trial court's inevitable
finding of uncopyrightability, the court described the work in the very
language of the definition of a copyrightable compilation: "the cards are
essentially a compilation of financial facts collected from various sources,
the key facts being those selected for publication."' 35 If this collection
and selection was original, it was copyrightable. But the court was
determined to add a creativity requirement in order to distinguish the
Second Circuit from those circuits following the "industrious collection"
line of cases. These cases conferred copyright protection because of the
labor involved in obtaining the facts for the compilation, whether the
structural expression of those facts was original or not.'36
The Financial Information case was remanded for a determination of
whether the plaintiff's cards "involved a modicum of selection, coordination
or arrangement" sufficient for copyrightability."37 The Court of Appeals'
characterization of the work as a compilation of collected and selected facts
should have been enough to answer this question.
such work may be more freely published under Section 107 than those of a creative nature.").
130. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). See supra part H.B.
131. 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984).
132. Id at 502.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 503 n.2. It is appropriate to point out that the parties did not even view
copyrightability as an issue. In a footnote to its opinion, the Court of Appeals noted that it was
unclear whether the issue of copyrightabilty was preserved on appeal, but addressed it anyway
based on a footnote in appellant's brief.
135. Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
136. Financial Info., 751 F.2d at 504-07.
137. Id at 507.
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The District Court reviewed the question on remand without the
benefit of additional evidence, 3 ' which is only natural since creativity
cannot be decided as an evidentiary question and is purely subjective to the
judge handling the case. It found that "the modicum of selectivity,
coordination or arrangement required by the Court of Appeals to qualify for
copyright protection [was] simply not present. There [was] no coordination
or arrangement of the data except to codify it into a uniform mold."'
139
The Court failed to explain how collected data could have been codified
into a uniform mold without some selection, coordination or arrangement
by the plaintiff. The language used by the courts in this case reveals the
error in their decisions.
3. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.
The Supreme Court made a feeble attempt to justify the creativity
requirement in the recent case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.Y" The Feist Court noted that the 1976 Act's
definition of compilation required that the preexisting material be selected,
coordinated or arranged "in such a way as to render the work as a whole
original."'' The Court concluded from this language that the statute
envisions that there will be some fact-based works in which the selection,
coordination or arrangement are not sufficiently original to trigger copyright
protection." This is partially correct: a selection, coordination or
arrangement that is not original is not protectable by copyright. However,
it is incorrect to conclude that "[o]riginality requires only that the author
make the selection or arrangement independently, (i.e., without copying that
selection or arrangement from another work), and that it display some
minimal level of creativity.""' Where did this second requirement come
from? The 1976 Act does not contain a creativity requirement, only
originality, which can be achieved merely by not copying."
138. Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. 803, 805 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
139. IU
140. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
141. Id4 at 1285 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
142. 1M
143. 1& (emphasis added).
144. Nowhere does the Act define a "work of authorship" to include creativity; only
tangibility is required. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of
"compilation").
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The Court's mistake was assuming that some degree of originality is
required. It is not. Originality in this sense is like pregnancy, and there is
no such thing as a pregnant woman who has less than a modicum of
pregnancy. Some women who are farther along in the process may be said
to be "more pregnant" than others; likewise, some copyrightable works may
be called "more original" than others. If the work is original at all,
however, it is protectable to the extent of its originality. A requirement of
a modicum of creativity is spkious. If any element of a work's expression,
either literal or structural, is original, then it necessarily is "creative" to the
same extent that it is original.
The problem with Feist is that the same outcome could have been
achieved without this "modicum of creativity" requirement. In Feist, the
plaintiff was seeking protection for a standard "white pages" collection and
arrangement of names in alphabetical order with addresses and telephone
numbers.145 As the Court noted, this type of arrangement "is an age-old
practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to
be expected as a matter of course .... It is not only unoriginal, it is
practically inevitable."'
146
The expressions for which plaintiff was seeking protection simply
were not original. This is an evidentiary matter: no reasonable jury would
have believed that the employees of Rural Telephone Service conceived
their arrangement in a vacuum, unaffected by the demonstrable fact that
practically every single phone book ever used has the same arrangement.
Nor was Rural's selection original, since it was mandated by state law. The
elements for which Rural sought protection were not protected because they
were not original. The modicum of creativity language in this opinion
should be viewed as pure dicta.
D. Copyrightability Means Only That the Work is Marketable and Not
Copied
The creativity requirement has been imposed on copyright owners
seeking to prove that their works are copyrightable. 47 Since copyright-
ability is merely an aspect of a product that allows the owner to convey his
exclusive rights in the marketplace, the question of copyrightability can
properly arise only when the work is not yet in the marketplace. However,
145. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1285.
146. 1l
147. See supra part IV.C.3.
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such a case is unlikely to appear, and indeed probably cannot appear due
to the federal court system's exclusive jurisdiction over copyright cases and
the "case and controversy" requirement in federal courts.148 Only works
that actually produce a market dispute will come to court, and therefore
(absent some inconceivable extraordinary circumstance) courts may
presume that if a willing buyer exists, such a work is copyrightable.
If the policy of the law is to promote the progress of knowledge, then
the public must be allowed to make whatever lawful use of the work the
ingenuity of humanity may conceive. A potential user is subject only to
the limitation that he not use the work in a manner for which the owner
holds an exclusive right without authority from the owner.' The
progress of knowledge can best be promoted by expanding the market for
copyrightable works. No downside such as oversupply exists in expansion
of the market for intellectual property. Only by expanding that market can
the marketplace of ideas be broadened, thereby promoting the progress of
knowledge.
The effect of a requirement that denies copyrightability to a work
already in the marketplace is removal of that work from the market.
Absent enforcement of the exclusivity of the owner's rights, such works are
not marketable. By requiring that a work be removed from the market,
courts imposing unnecessary threshold requirements preclude all further
uses of both the expression and the ideas or information contained in a
work. In effect, such courts make the arrogant and insupportable announce-
ment that no person in the future will be able to make any use of the work
that may contribute to the progress of knowledge. Such a determination is
purely one of speculation and beyond the proper role of the courts,
operating only to restrict the marketplace of ideas without producing any
corresponding benefit. Courts must not deny that an original work already
in the marketplace is entitled to participate.
A copyright means nothing if the owner fails to bring it to the
marketplace. ° The courts' role in copyright law, as in any other trade
regulation, is to remedy injuries and to enjoin abuses. While the courts
may determine the value obtained, they cannot say that the work had no
148. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 1.
149. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (uses are enumerated). Of course, a potential user is limited by
other laws that would prohibit the use of intellectual property, for example, in obscenity,
defamation or conspiracy, but these uses are outside the scope of the copyright law.
150. This is why, until the 1976 Act, statutory copyright protection applied only after
publication. An author who merely creates a writing does nothing of any particular value to
society, whereas an author who disseminates his writings, once they are created, promotes the
progress of knowledge.
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marketable value if a buyer in fact perceived such a value. A court cannot
say that a portion of the price paid for the work was not based on some
originality and therefore that value was not being received.
How much value the work has in the marketplace, however, is another
question, and one to be determined only by the result obtained in the
marketplace itself.'5 ' If allowed to operate correctly, the market will
place a value on a copyrightable work in proportion to both the intellectual
content and the originality of its expression. If a work has no value to any
buyer, then the market itself will exclude the work. It is absolutely
unnecessary, and indeed it is entirely inappropriate, for a court to mandate
such exclusion.
If a man brings questionable produce to the marketplace and says,
"This is the fruit of my labor, buy it," and if the potential buyer's reaction
is to say, "You call this fruit? I've seen pits bigger than this," then the
market has determined that the fruit has no value and there is no reason for
a court so to determine. If another buyer, however, says, 'This is good
fruit to me, I will buy it," how can a court say that it was not fruit?
Likewise, if an author brings his work to the market and another willingly
buys some or all of his bundle of rights, how can a court say it was not
copyrightable, and therefore, not a marketable work? If it commands the
interest of any public, such interest is proof of the copyrightability of the
work.
If a work is in the marketplace, the court's sole determination is
limited to whether the defendant's use of it was lawful. This issue can
involve only a determination of whether the particular expression used by
the defendant for which the plaintiff seeks protection is original to the
plaintiff, and it does not require examination of the entire work for some
originality." If the expression used by the defendant is original to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to copyright protection as a remedy for the
wrong committed by the defendant. Only if the defendant has used the
entire work must the plaintiff's entire work be examined for originality, and
even then it is original to some extent unless it was entirely copied from a
preexisting source. Since it is unnecessary to examine the plaintiff's entire
work, to say that the work is not copyrightable is not only unnecessary, it
151. "[Ulnlike real property and other forms of personal property, a copyright is by its very
nature incapable of accurate monetary evaluation prior to its exploitation." Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 219 (1990) (citing 2 NIMMR & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 9.02).
152. Some courts call this an analysis of copyrightability, but the issue is more properly
termed "protectability." Original expressions are protectable, works containing such expressions
are copyrightable.
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also restricts the marketplace of ideas in contravention of the policy of the
Copyright Clause. In short, if a work is not entirely copied and is in the
marketplace, it should be copyrightable.
E. Who is the Author of a Derivative Work?
The equation of authorship with originality helps to explain why the
holding in Stewart v. Abend 53 regarding recapture of rights in derivative
works is incorrect. The Stewart holding has the effect of making the author
of the preexisting work an author of the derivative work as well."5 This
is because the author of the preexisting work has the authority to control
dissemination of the derivative work as well, and that authority is vested
only in authors under section 102. '55
It strains common sense to think that we should call Holinshed an
author of Henry V and Richard II, for example. Holinshed wrote his own
literary works on those subjects which Shakespeare borrowed from to create
his plays. 56 Once the derivative author actually prepares his derivative
work, however, he extinguishes all rights that the author of the preexisting
work could have in the derivative work.
When a publisher buys the right to publish a work from an author, he
sells the author's original work to the public. The original expressions in
the work remain to the same extent that they were original when the author
created them. On the other hand, when these same expressions are used in
a derivative work, they are no longer original to that derivative work, even
though the expressions themselves may survive the derivation process
unchanged. Having been used in the derivation process, such expressions
lose their originality and are not protectable as they appear in the derivative
work. This is not to say that they are not still protectable as they appear
in the preexisting work, and that the first author may not obtain protection
against unauthorized use of them on the basis of the viability of his
copyright in the preexisting work."5 If that copyright expires, then there
153. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
154. See id.
155. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
156. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
157. This can be done by tracing a defendant's access to certain expressions through the
derivative work to the preexisting work.
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is no protection, even though the copyright on the derivative work, from
which the infringer may have taken the expression, remains intact.58
The author of a preexisting work, while he may recapture the right to
allow others to prepare derivative works from his preexisting work, may not
obtain any right to control the dissemination of a derivative work already
lawfully prepared. The reason for this is simple: he is not an author of the
derivative work, and copyright law's exclusive rights vest only in the author
of a work. He is not an author of the derivative work because none of the
original expressions in the derivative work are his. A right to control
dissemination of the derivative work, as improvidently granted by the
Stewart Court, cannot be held by one who is not an author (or who does
.not derive his authority from that author). Only the creator of the original
expressions in this new work, the derivative author, has rights subsisting in
the derivative work.
V. LMITED TIMS
The ostensible purpose of the "limited times" requirement of the
Copyright Clause is to facilitate the creation of the public domain." 9
"The copyright term is limited so that the public will not be permanently
deprived of the fruits of an artist's labors."'" The limited times require-
ment is purportedly intended "to allow the public access to the products of
[the authors]' genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired.''
There is no necessary relation between the limited duration of
copyright and public access to copyrightable works. 62 Public access to
such works is facilitated by the creation of a marketplace for such works.
A limited times requirement can actually work against such access by
undermining one of the essential requirements of such a marketplace:
exclusivity."63 The creation of a public domain can destroy the market-
place for copyrightable works. "In some cases the lack of copyright
158. '"he copyright in [a derivative] work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge
the ... duration ... of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material." 17 U.S.C. § 103(b)
(1988).
159. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
160. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990).
161. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
162. See supra part L
163. "If the defendant could legally infringe [plaintiffi's right to make and distribute copies,
[plaintiff] and other producers of copyrightable material would hesitate to invest in its creation
and development." Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 10 (N.D. I. 1983).
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protection actually restrains dissemination of the work because publishers
and other users cannot risk investing in the work unless assured of
exclusive rights."
'1 "
If it is understood that copyright is a natural property right, whereas
patents are monopoly grants, the difference in the application of the
"limited times" requirement can also be understood. Patent protection
remains extremely limited in duration, seventeen years under the current
law,'16 while the duration of a copyright has been steadily extended to its
current term of the life of the author plus fifty years,'" or seventy-five
years from publication where the author is not an ascertainable natural
person.' 6 A patent restricts access to its ideas, and this restriction is
limited so that the ideas may be freely used after the inventor has been
given a window of opportunity to exploit the product of his genius. On the
other hand, a copyright has no impact on the public's access to its ideas.
There is, therefore, no need to limit the duration of the copyright to assure
such access. The ability to make fair use of a copyrightable work also
guarantees access to the fruits of an author's labor.'68
Melville B. and David Nimmer state that the constitutional require-
ment prohibits Congress from granting exclusive rights of unlimited
duration. 69 Further, they note that if Congress were to extend the term
of copyright to several hundred years, it would create a line-drawing
problem as to whether such a term would be "tantamount to perpetual
protection."'7 0  This observation overlooks the apparent fact that the
current term of life-plus-fifty years (or seventy-five years) is longer than the
useful life of almost all copyrightable works being produced today, and in
effect is tantamount to perpetual protection.
For example, it would be hard to imagine computer software or
informational compilations that would be useful, and therefore marketable,
for seventy-five years. Popular novels and nonfiction books, magazine and
newspaper articles, stories, photographs and cartoons, televisions shows,
and even motion pictures have little or no appeal on the marketplace after
164. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5750.
165. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
167. Id § 302(c).
168. See H.L REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5752 (the 1976 Act "would not restrain scholars from using any work as
source material or from 'fair use' of copyrightable works).
169. 1 NNIMER & NnvMMR, supra note 2, § 1.05[AI~h].
170. Id.
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the passage of three quarters of a century. How many copyrightable works
created before World War I demonstrate any marketable value today? If
the advance of technology maintains even the same pace in the twenty-first
century that it has showed in the twentieth, this pre-copyright term obsoles-
cence for virtually all copyrightable works will continue unabated. Only
works that achieve a classic status will maintain market viability, and will
be able to attract a publisher willing to invest the capital required to
disseminate the work and survive long enough to enter the public domain.
In this sense, that portion of the public domain created by the limited times
requirement will resemble a sort of artistic "hall of fame" open to only a
relative handful of works of enduring societal value.
This is not to say, however, that the limited times requirement serves
no purpose or that Justice Holmes' observation that copyright "is a right
which could not be recognized or endured for more than a limited time" is
unwarranted. 7' Justice Holmes' remark was made in the context of the
intangible nature of copyright and the difficulty of ascertaining the
subsistence of such rights in a work. 72 The copyright term reflects the
idea that after a certain period of time it may be impossible to determine
who, if anyone, is the owner of the work. The existence of these property
rights is not apparent from the work itself, unlike land or chattels, for
which one can assume that an owner of the property rights exists. In those
rare cases where some aspect of original expression remains marketable for
over half a century and the owner of the copyright therein is difficult to
ascertain, the limited times requirement assures the free use of the
expression in order to promote the progress of knowledge.
Under the 1976 Act, any necessary or useful limitations on copyrights
take the form of express limitations on the scope of such rights, carefully
tailored to the characteristics of the type of work in question. Limitations
are not imposed on the duration of the rights, which duration is usually
171. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, .,
concurring).
172.
[In copyright property has reached a more abstract expression. The right to ex-
clude is not directed to an object in possession or owned, but is in vacuo so to
speak. It restrains the spontaneity of men where, but for it, there would be nothing
of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit. It is a prohibition of conduct
remote from the persons or tangibles of the party having the right. It may be in-
fringed a thousand miles from the owner and without his ever becoming aware of
the wrong.
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longer than the practical life of the works in which the rights subsist.73
The limited times requirement is therefore of relatively little significance
in modem copyright law.
VI. PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE BY SECURING RIGHTS
A. The Constitution Mandates a Marketplace
By understanding the predicate concepts of the Copyright Clause
(limited times, authors, exclusive rights, and writings) the central purpose
of the Copyright Clause can be seen: it achieves a public benefit in the
progress of knowledge by securing such rights. The structure of the
Copyright Clause is not limited to a proclamation that this is beneficial.
Rather, it assumes that promoting the progress of knowledge is advanta-
geous and directs Congress to achieve this benefit by securing exclusive
rights in intellectual property. It mandates the creation of a marketplace,
wherein this unique form of property, the copyright, may be traded and
protected. To achieve this mandate, the policy must necessarily protect all
intermediary market participants between the author and the public. The
reward of copyright extends to authorized disseminators, as well as to
originators; the constitutional requirement is that the public marketplace be
allowed to determine the value of each contribution and therefore the size
of his reward.
B. The Paramount Fallacy
The underlying policy of the Copyright Clause is entirely incompatible
with the notion that "[tihe copyright law... makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration."'74 This notion is the proclamation of a court
espousing on antitrust principles, and it is one of the great fallacies of
modem copyright jurisprudence."5
It would be similarly fallacious to say that in a real estate transaction,
the money paid to the seller is only a secondary consideration, with the
primary value of the transaction consisting of the conveyance of the parcel
to the buyer. Both the money and the land in such a transaction are
173. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1988).
174. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (citing Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
175. One of these antitrust ideas was that a copyright is a monopoly; see supra part mI.E.
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consideration; neither is more important to the public, although at the time
of the transaction the money is more important to the seller and the land is
more important to the buyer. The value to society consists merely in the
existence of a market for the land so that property may be obtained by
those who are likely to put it to better use. Likewise, for intellectual
property; the value to society consists in the existence of a market for the
authors' writings. The money paid to the author is by no means secondary.
Rather, it is the unavoidable result of the creation of a market because a
market cannot exist without the promise of reward to owners of property
who choose to place that property on the market.
The Paramount fallacy, that reward to authors is a secondary
consideration, is based on a misreading of a passage from an early Supreme
Court case, Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal.16 The Fox Film Court noted that
"[t]he sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring
the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors."1" This observation is unquestionably correct to the
extent it holds that the public interest lies in the creation of a market for
authors' works so that its ideas may be disseminated.
It is an obvious misreading of Fox Film, however, to conclude that
reward to authors is but a secondary consideration or even no consider-
ation.1 78 The question presented in Fox Film was "whether copyrights are
to be deemed instrumentalities of the Federal Government and hence
immune from state taxation."' 79 The conclusion that the "sole interest of
the United States" is the public benefit derived from dissemination of
copyrighted works is merely a refutation of the petitioners' argument that
the United States retains an interest in a copyright, which would exempt
copyright royalties from state taxation. 80
When the Fox Film Court referred to the "sole interest of the United
States," it addressed the concept of copyright from the perspective of the
interface of tax law and sovereign immunities.' It held that the federal
government, which created the right, did not retain any interest other than
the general public benefit created by the existence of a market for the
176. 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
177. Id. at 127.
178. At least one court misguided by the Paramount fallacy has opined that "Copyright
monopolies are not granted for the purpose of rewarding authors." Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback
Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 52 (D. Mass. 1990) (emphasis added).
179. Fox Film, 286 U.S. at 126-27.
180. Id. at 127.
181. Id.
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right."s  The public clearly desires to have a market for intellectual
property rights in that they are willing to exchange value for such rights.
The government is then obligated to society to protect the exclusivity of the
rights traded in that market. This provision of the social compact is
embodied by the Framers in the Copyright Clause.
C. The Free Flow of Ideas and Information
Not all courts have accepted the Paramount fallacy. For example, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals once specifically refuted the "secondary
consideration" proclamation propounded by Paramount and its progeny:
Despite what is said in some of the authorities that the author's
interest in securing an economic reward for his labors is "a
secondary consideration," it is clear that the real purpose of the
copyright scheme is to encourage works of the intellect, and that
this purpose is to be achieved by reliance on the economic
incentives granted to authors and inventors by the copyright
scheme. This scheme relies on the author to promote the
progress of science by permitting him to control the cost of and
access to his novelty. It is based on the premise that the
exclusive right granted by the copyright laws "will not impose
unacceptable costs to society in terms of limiting access to
published works or pricing them too high."'"
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit came to the erroneous conclusion that Sony
was contributing to, and committing copyright infringement.' Further,
the Supreme Court chose to reiterate the Paramount pablum in reversing
the Court of Appeals' conclusion.'85
To the Sony Court, copyright law represents "a difficult balance
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploita-
tion of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on
the other hand."'' 6 In contrast, Madison opined that, rather than being in
competition, "[tihe public good fully coincides in both cases [copyright and
182. Id.
183. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1981)
(quotations omitted), rev'd 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
184. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
185. Id.
186. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
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patent] with the claims of individuals."" Does the public interest
compete, or does it fully coincide, with the claims of authors?
There is no mandate in the Copyright Clause that the progress of
knowledge be facilitated by the free flow of ideas and information. Rather,
the clause mandates the creation of a marketplace for expressions of
ideas." 8 A marketplace presumes some limitation on the activity of its
participants. An exclusive right requires the ability to exclude certain uses
of property, and therefore necessarily negates the possibility of an
absolutely unfettered free flow of information.
A concern for the free flow of information is somewhat like a concern
for the free flow of water uphill. Water must be constrained by a conduit
and subjected to a force to go uphill. As we have seen, the motivating
force for ideas springs from the restless ingenuity of humanity itself. But
without the proper conduit, such energy is wasted. The constraint of the
marketplace is what assures the continuity of the flow of ideas and
information from authors to the consuming public; copyright law supplies
this constraint. "IT]he [Flramers intended copyright itself to be the engine
of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas."'8 9
Copyright law is the engine of free expression; it is responsible for the
"flow" in the free flow of ideas and information. Without the constraints
of copyright law, there would be little, if any, flow.
D. The Relationship Between Copyright Law and the First Amendment
As I have noted, Professor Nimmer has already demonstrated that
copyright does not implicate the First Amendment because it does not
extend to ideas.' The converse has been succinctly stated: "The [F]irst
[A]mendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in
187. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
188. See generally, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
189. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (emphasis
added). See also, Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184,
1187 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The judgment of the constitution is that free expression is enriched by
protecting the creations of authors from exploitation by others, and the Copyright Act is the
implementation of that judgment.").
190. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). See supra
part ll.A.
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intellectual property.'' 9 While copyright law and the First Amendment
may not compete, one cannot say that they are independent of each other.
Both seek to regulate the expression of ideas and information.
Because of this overlapping objective, copyright law and the First
Amendment have a complementary relationship that is even symbiotic
rather than competing. This relationship is rooted in the most basic tenet
of the American constitutional tradition, that government must not exist
independently of, but rather as an extension of, the people. Copyright law
actually facilitates the policies of the First Amendment by the creation of
a private sector market. The creation and dissemination of ideas is taken
out of the government's control and transferred to the'public marketplace,
which the Framers believed was better suited than the government to make
decisions as to the relative value of various expressions of ideas and
information. The marketplace created by copyright assures the dissemina-
tion of ideas without interference by government, which should be
prohibited from influencing the content of such ideas. Government's role
in the free flow of ideas and information is therefore limited to protecting
market rights and preventing abuses of the marketplace through enforce-
ment and protection by federal courts.
No one doubts that a free flow of ideas and information is valuable
to society. However, it is important to realize that the freedom inherent in
this concept is guaranteed by the First Amendment and the flow is
guaranteed by copyright law's creation of a marketplace. The rights of
authors do not compete with the interest of society.
VII. THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE POWER
We turn finally to perhaps the most overlooked portion of the
Copyright Clause, that which invests the power to create the copyright
marketplace in the federal government. Understanding this portion of the
clause contributes much to understanding the fundamental purpose of
copyright law. Why should a federal government of limited and specifical-
ly enumerated powers be given this power?
According to Madison, Congress must be vested with this power
because "[t]he States cannot separately make effectual provision" for
191. Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th
Cir. 1979).
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copyright and patent legislation." A nation of sovereign states, whose
individual copyright laws create a patchwork quilt of varying and perhaps
opposing copyright legislation, cannot have a smoothly functioning
copyright marketplace. The rationale for investing the federal Congress
with the power to legislate copyright law is the same as that giving Con-
gress the power to regulate interstate commerce in general; multiplicity of
regulation impairs the proper functioning of an open market. 93 If the
public is to be allowed to determine the relative value of copyrightable
works by operating a marketplace free of governmental interference, then
any regulation that impedes the optimal performance of that marketplace
necessarily impedes the public's ability to determine relative value.
Seen in this light, the Copyright Clause constitutes a trade regulation,
not an accommodation of genius or a motivator of imagination. Its impact
is as much negative as affirmative. The Copyright Clause divests power
from the states in order to prevent their inevitable multiplicity of regulation
from interfering with the functioning of the marketplace mandated by that
portion of the social compact embodied in portions of the Copyright
Clause.' 94
By allowing the natural rights that inhere in the fruit of an author's
labor to be transferable, and as fully enforceable in the transferee as in the
author, copyright law facilitates not merely creation but more importantly
dissemination. Divesting individual states of the power to regulate
disseminators of copyright, and other goods and services, enhances the
correct operation of that marketplace for the general benefit of society.
The Copyright Clause, therefore, is more like the Commerce Clause
than many have ever suspected. This conclusion is reinforced by the
realization that, over the years, the exclusivity of the federal government's
control over copyright law has increased in much the same manner as the
federal government's control over interstate commerce. Likewise,
international barriers to the copyright market resulting from inconsistent
regulation by various nations have been subject to increasing efforts to
192. THE FEDERAUIsT No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
193. See id.
194. Valuable artistic and scientific works can be created under an autocracy just as easily
as under the democracy the Framers were putting together. Most of the great works of art,
science, and literature with which the Framers were familiar, would have been produced in
autocratic societies. However, those works had often been closely held by the autocrats whose
beneficence facilitated their creation. Such works would be more valuable in a democratic society
if an efficient means of dissemination could be devised. The means was an open marketplace,
allowing artists and inventors to convey the products of their genius directly to the people without
interference from a governing body.
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remove those barriers much as support for international free trade in general
has increased. Copyright law in America is primarily a form of trade
regulation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
American copyright law is comprised of several basic principles.
First, works of authorship are tangible forms of expression that are not
wholly copied from some preexisting source, thus retaining some originali-
ty.
Second, tangible forms, for which copyright protection subsists,
include both literal and structural expressions, which are a collection and
assembly of literal expressions.
Third, people become authors as a result of their own spontaneous
ingenuity, and the purpose of copyright law is merely to allow them to
make a living from their genius and facilitate the dissemination of their
results.
Fourth, copyright is a natural property right arising from results, that
when properly defined, cannot lead to the sort of antitrust abuses possible
in lawful monopolies such as patents.
Fifth, copyright protection when properly defined extends only to
tangible expression and never to the ideas or information so expressed. For
this reason, copyright is not a monopoly and it cannot interfere with the
freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Sixth, because copyright protection extends only to expression, access
to ideas or information is not impeded. A copyright should be enforceable
as long as possible to ensure a work's marketability, and therefore guard
dissemination of the ideas and information expressed therein. Protection
should end only when the passage of time makes it too difficult to ascertain
the existence of the copyright owner.
Seventh, the states are divested of power to govern copyright in order
to avoid inconsistent regulation and thereby assure an optimal operation of
an open marketplace; conceivably, this is the primary reason the Copyright
Clause is found in the Constitution.
Eighth, Congress is required to define the scope of the valuable and
enforceable rights in works of authorship, insuring the creation of an open
market to facilitate the dissemination of ideas and information contained in
such works.
Finally, copyright law's value to society consists of the creation and
protection of a marketplace for rights inherent in tangible expressions, in
order to increase the marketplace for the ideas so expressed. Absent such
19931
42 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14
a market for copyrightable works, the public would receive no such benefit
and there would be no progress in society's collective knowledge, which is
assumed to be a beneficial goal for society.
